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Abstract 
This paper discusses the “flexibility-security nexus” which has become manifest in 
employment, the labour market and industrial relations. The starting point of the paper is the 
concept of “flexicurity”, viewed as a particular way of dealing with the aforementioned nexus. 
The analysis focuses on four EU-member states: Denmark, Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands. The paper explores differences in the emphasis put on types and levels of 
flexibility and security, the particular trade-offs between forms of flexibility and security and 
the institutional contexts that “govern” these types, levels and trade-offs. In doing so the paper 
highlights important barriers, opportunities and challenges in dealing with the flexibility-
security nexus. Coordinated decentralisation and flexible multi-level governance in national 
IR-systems seem to represent important preconditions for the introduction of flexicurity 
arrangements, as the Danish and Dutch cases show.  
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1 INTRODUCTION: THE FLEXIBILITY-SECURITY-NEXUS 
 
The member states of the European Union (EU), as well as the EU itself, are confronted with 
a ‘double bind’, that can be summed up as the flexibility-security nexus (Wilthagen, 2002). 
On one hand, there is the demand for increased flexibility in order to reinforce the competitive 
power and performance of companies, sectors, countries and the EU as a whole. On the other 
hand, unease is mounting with respect to processes of social exclusion, segmentation, modern 
poverty and jeopardised social integration and cohesion. Labour and the labour market place 
demands on job security, wage security and employability. This relationship exists on the 
basis of a certain degree of tension. Based on an extensive international comparative study, 
Ozaki (1999: 116) concludes that ‘the flexibilisation of the labour market has led to a 
significant erosion of workers’ rights in fundamentally important areas which concern their 
employment and income security and the (relative) stability of their working and living 
conditions. Regarding the trade-offs arising from flexibility bargaining, there has not been an 
attempt to drastically change the present paradigms of economic and social policy’. 
In view of the necessity to deal with the flexibility-security nexus, this article takes as a 
starting-point the notion of  ‘flexicurity’: a policy strategy in which both objectives, flexibility 
and security, are represented in a more or less integrated and balanced manner (see 
Wilthagen, 1998). Flexicurity can, more precisely, be defined as a policy-strategy that 
attempts, synchronically and in a deliberate way, to enhance the flexibility of labour markets, 
the work organisation and labour relations on the one hand, and to enhance the security – 
employment security and social security – notably for weak groups inside and outside the 
labour market on the other hand’ (see, slighty different, Wilthagen & Rogowski, 2002:250). 
The main questions of this paper can now be formulated as follows: 
1.  To what extent and how does the flexibility-security nexus play a role in various EU 
countries. Do examples of flexicurity exists at the various levels in those countries? 
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2.  What hypotheses can be formulated regarding beneficial conditions within governance 
systems for the formation and operation of flexicurity? Which framework can be used 
for further research into flexicurity? 
This paper is highly explorative in nature. The purpose is to develop more hypotheses and 
questions in the context of academic knowledge and policy. In order to prevent the exercise 
becoming too broad, the analysis will focus on four EU member states: Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany and the Netherlands. The choice for these countries is based primarily on 
geographical proximity, as well as the fact that the structures and traditions of labour 
relationships and regulation are not too dissimilar (elements of both corporatism and social 
democracy, often characterised as democratic corporatism). This also means that there is a 
chance that these countries will try to learn from one another in terms of adjustment 
strategies. At the same time, these countries demonstrate a sufficiently interesting variation in 
actual developments to enable determinative factors to be ascertained. 
In order to be able to analyse developments in the four countries, it is necessary to distinguish 
between various forms of flexibility and security and various possible trade-offs.  
Four forms of work flexibility can be distinguished, namely:  
a.  External numerical flexibility (the flexibility of hiring and firing) 
b.  Internal numerical flexibility (working hours, overtime, part-time work, 
etc.) 
c.  Functional flexibility (multi-employability, flexible organisation of 
 work) 
d.  Wage flexibility (performance or result-based pay) 
In terms of security, four forms can also be distinguished, namely: 
a.  Job security, the certainty of retaining a specific job with a specific employer 
b.  Employment security/employability security, the certainty of remaining in work (not 
necessarily with the same employer) 
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d.  “Combination security”, the certainty of being able to combine paid work with other 
social responsibilities and obligations. This last form of security cannot be traced back 
to the other forms of security.  
 
It is possible that direct trade-offs take place between these forms of flexibility and certain 
forms of security, but more indirect trade-offs are foreseeable as well.  
 
Both in academic and in policy circles, ‘governance’ – and more specifically ‘multi-
governance’ – is seen as an important factor for the success of new developments in 
employment regulation. ‘Europe’ is attempting to achieve its ambitious objectives of 
flexibility and security by improving governance (European Commission, 2001). There is 
also a growing interest in multilevel governance among national systems. Trends such as 
‘centralised decentralisation’, organised decentralisation and recentralisation point towards a 
dynamic in the relationships between levels (Léonard, 2001; Sisson & Marginson, 2002; 
Traxler, 1995). This paper will be addressing the relationship between flexicurity and 
governance systems (and shifts in such systems) in the individual countries.  We adopt the 
definition of governance given by Hollingsworth et al. (1994:5): “Coordination is 
accomplished through a set of institutions that together form the economy's system of 
governance. A governance system is defined as the totality of institutional arrangements – 
including rules and rule-making agents - that regulate transactions inside and across the 
boundaries of an economic system.”  (italics in original). 
It is to be expected that the instruments with which balances between flexibility and security 
can be achieved, and the forms thereof, will differ between the countries, as a result – among 
other things – of institutional and legislative differences. It cannot automatically be assumed 
that there is a trend towards convergence. Within the framework of this contribution, 
however, it is only possible to provide an extremely brief analysis. The focus will be on the 
most obvious developments, similarities and differences, with a view to forming hypotheses 
on the basis thereof. 
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2 POLICY DEVELOPMENTS AND STRATEGIES, 
  INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1   BELGIUM: FORDIST FLEXIBILITY AND SECURITY 
2.1.1 FLEXIBILITY AND SECURITY 
 
The term flexibilisation of the workforce has – to a larger extent and for a longer period than 
in the Netherlands – a negative connotation in Belgium, in any event among the trade unions. 
During the 1990s, Belgian employers increasingly pointed to the assumed advantages of the 
policy developments in the Netherlands (Sels & van Hootegem, 1999). It was argued that 
Belgium had a more Fordist regime than the Netherlands: the service sector in Belgium is less 
prominent than the industrial sector, and the same applies to temporary/part-time work when 
compared to the permanent, full-time job.  
Flexibility in Belgium is primarily internal-numerical in nature. More use is made in Belgium 
of shift work, and work is carried out more frequently during non-standard hours. 
Furthermore, the country has extensive legislation that allows workers to be laid off 
temporarily in exchange for unemployment benefit (Sels & van Hootegem, 1999). During the 
1993-1996 period, 30 to 40 thousand workers a year made use of the arrangement. This 
system is not available for the category of clerical staff. Sels & Van Hootegem attribute the 
following two functions to the system of temporary unemployment: 
It avoids companies having to impose mass lay-offs during an economic downturn, and then 
when the economy picks up having to recruit and train staff from scratch. This prevents 
transaction costs, maintains human capital within the company, maintains levels of 
qualification and prevents job losses; 
The system can be seen as a functional equivalent to atypical work (temporary contracts, 
contracts for a definite period) and overtime.  
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One disadvantage of the arrangement that has been identified is that the system is not 
particularly transparent, that it favours insiders in the labour market and that it can encourage 
over-capacity, which large companies can then exploit in the knowledge that the taxpayer will 
foot the bill. It is also possible that this system negatively affects companies’ innovation, as 
they do not adapt to changing market situations and competitive relationships, or that their 
response is too late. Another barrier to innovation could also be that economic downturn 
periods are not used for training staff and improving employee qualifications, as would be 
logical, because the employees in question are ‘parked’ outside the company at that time. 
Sels & Van Hootegem see an argument for amending the temporary unemployment scheme 
by encouraging companies to use the social security funds and the times of recession for 
investing in training and process innovation. In this way, flexibility and innovation would not 
always have to be at odds with one another.  
 
According to the National Plan of Action Employment Guidelines, policy orientation in 
Belgium focuses primarily on promoting part-time work and career interruption. It is also 
targeted at increasing the range of flexible childcare opportunities, in order to increase the 
employability of job seekers and other non-actives. One of the central issues in the collective 
negotiations in 2001 was improvement of the balance between work and family and social 
obligations (EIRO, 2002). Legislative measures were also taken in this area. 
A national agreement was signed in 2001 by employers and employees, which contained both 
elements for increasing the flexibility of the business community (such as carrying out a study 
into the differences in the law covering manual workers and clerical workers, and 
simplification of a range of administrative obligations, intended to create a better climate for 
entrepreneurship and innovation) as well as increasing security for employees (such as 
creating more employment opportunities, promoting a good combination of work and private 
life, and continuing training efforts). 
Almost no empirical data is available on wage flexibility or variable remuneration in 
Belgium. As has been the case in other countries, a greater emphasis on this form of 
flexibility is expected in Belgium (EIRO, 2001). In 2002, the debate has been about scrapping 
automatic pay indexation, which links pay to increases in the cost of living. Another draft bill 
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10% of a company’s total wage bill.
1 Figure 1 summarizes the foregoing analysis; “policy 
focus” refers to the main emphasis that policies have displayed over the past years, whereas 




Figure 1: Focus and direction of Belgian policy orientation on flexibility and security 
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For many years, the sector level has been the most prominent negotiation level, in 
combination with the regional level (Flanders vs. Wallonia). Compared to the Netherlands, 
the system of labour relations is more centralised and central coordination within the Belgian 
trade union movement – which is also very present on the workfloor – remains strong (Mok, 
2001). At a national level, intersectoral collective agreements are being entered into, which 
have the status of legislation and which cover aspects which in many other countries are 
governed by law (working hours, minimum wage level, etc.). Interprofessional agreements are 
also entered into at this level – when they are successful. These agreements are in principle 
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negotiated every two years by the parties represented in the National Labour Council (NAR). 
The organisations involved reach agreements among themselves concerning the ‘social 
progress’ which they wish to realise during the following two years for the actives and non-
actives. 
 
One remarkable aspect is the highly interventionist role played by the government in socio-
economic and labour market policy. Contrary to the Netherlands, for example, the Belgian 
government has actually increased its level of intervention since the serious decline in value 
of the franc in 1982 (Hemerijck et al., 2000). In 1996, the Competition in Business Act came 
into effect, which links pay development in Belgium to that in its neighbouring countries of 
Germany, France and the Netherlands. Despite the fact that national negotiations regularly 
break down, the social partners are entering into an interprofessional agreement for the 2001-
2002 period, which offers a framework for the sectoral negotiations and forms a response to 
major socio-economic challenges. They acknowledge the specific powers of the regions and 
of the regional social partners. The agreement is intended to achieve an optimum 
complementarity, using the measures taken at that level. 
It should be noted that in Belgium, neither horizontal nor vertical coordination inside or by 
the employers’ and employees’ organisations are particularly strong. In any case, it is weaker 
than in the Netherlands and Denmark. The lack of coordination may go some way towards 
explaining why pay restraint has been imposed by law. According to Hemerijck et al. (2000: 
250-254), the effect of the Belgian governance model in the 1990s, during which government 
pay politics was a prominent factor, was that micro-flexibility in the labour market was 
sacrificed in the attempts to realise macro-modifications (specifically with a view to 
admission to the EMU), that decentralisation was limited and that there have been far fewer 
links in negotiations between pay and pay development and other subjects, such as reduced 
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2.2. THE CASE OF DENMARK: HIGH FLEXIBILITY AND SECURITY 
 
2.2.1 FLEXIBILITY AND SECURITY 
 
Denmark has traditionally had a combination of extremely high flexibility in the labour 
market and an extremely high level of income protection. Since as far back as the September 
Agreement between employers’ and employees’ organisations (LO and DA) in 1899, there 
has been a very low level of regulation of hiring and firing, making it easy to fire employees 
when market conditions are poor. But they can fall back on relatively positive social security 
arrangements and can be re-hired fairly simply when the demand for personnel increases. Van 
Peijpe (1998) explains this combination of high flexibility and high social security from the 
fact that the Danish economy has a very large number of small businesses. 
In 1994 and 1996, in response to steep increases in long-term unemployment in the 1970s and 
1980s, far-reaching changes were implemented in labour market policy (Björklund, 2000; 
Jørgensen, 2002; Madsen, 1999; Madsen, 2002). It is interesting to note that these changes 
attempted to increase both flexibility (internal) for businesses and security (employability and 
combination) for employees and the unemployed. An initial re-evaluation involved scaling 
back the social security system (Benner & Vat, 2000: 448-452). A second round of reforms 
involved a shift from training and education of non-actives to increasing the skills and 
employability of the working population, using a system of job rotation (Madsen, 1999: 59). 
Job rotation is geared towards increasing the employability of employees by making time 
available for training outside the business, while an unemployed person temporarily replaces 
the employee. The Danish government funds the training for the employee and continues to 
pay his/her salary. Apart from funding the training, government schemes have promoted 
various forms of leave-based job rotation. An average of 20 to 30 thousand employees and job 
seekers – around 10% of the working population – took part in one of these programmes 
between 1993 and 1998 (Sørensen, 2001). Evaluations have shown that more than one-third 
of the unemployed stay employed by the company after the return of the employees they 
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positive response to both the job rotation programmes and the leave schemes. Figure 2 
summarises the key characteristics and conditions of the paid leave schemes. In 1996, 
121,000 people made use of a paid leave scheme, 72,700 of whom went on study leave, 






Dealing with the “ flexibility – security – nexus “ ; Institutions, strategies, opportunities and barriers   15
 
Figure 2: Danish paid leave schemes 
 














benefit as condition 
Yes Yes  No 
Maximum duration  1 year  1  year  (minimum 
period 13 weeks) 
26 weeks (13 weeks if 
child is less than 1 
year old) 
(previously 1 year for 
unemployed) 
Unconditional right of 
applicant 




No Yes  No 
Level of benefit (in % 
of unemployment 
benefit) 
100%  60% (formerly 80%)  60% (formerly 80%) 
 
 
From a general perspective, the reforms in Denmark form a trade-off between a degree of 
scaling down or limiting of social security entitlements on the one hand and an increased 
commitment of the public organisations and authorities to greatly increase the quality of 
activation, reintegration efforts and training on the other (Bredgaard, 2001: 62-63). A recent 
example is represented by the introduction of “flex jobs” within companies on behalf of the 
reintegration of workers with disabilities – flexibility here refers to the adjustment of these 
jobs in view of the capacities of the workers involved. The central concept in Danish labour 
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Denmark rarely find themselves in the same position a year later; this is a major difference 
between Denmark and Belgium, for example (Vandenbrande, 2001: 61-64). 
There is not a great deal that can be said about variable and flexible pay, except that a growth 
in this form of flexibilisation is expected in Denmark.  Figure 3 summarizes the Danish 
developments. 
 
Figure 3: Focus and direction of Danish policy orientation regarding flexibility and security 
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focus 
Forms of security 
Numerical-
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Numerical-
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The most prominent instrument in Danish socio-economic policy is the collective labour 
agreement. The collective agreement – as opposed to State labour law – is also used for 
implementing European directives. The argument for this is that it allows better coordination 
with the situation in the sectors and for the creation of an optimum base of support for 
implementation of the provisions. Partly in view of the criticism of the European 
Commission, Denmark is starting to realise that this system could cause legal and political 
problems, and that special measures must be introduced for the remaining groups that are not 
covered by collective agreements. 
The fact that around 80% of the Danish working population belongs to a trade union – a level 
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contributes to the key position of the collective agreement. In addition, Denmark has 
national/intersectoral agreements that hark back to the central agreement of 1899 which was 
mentioned above. Another notable characteristic is the extensive mediation and arbitration 
system in labour relations. In principle, the Danish government interferes as little as possible 
in the content of collective bargaining, and limits itself to statutory procedural regulations. 
There is no general obligation to bargain collectively in Denmark. 
The developments in Denmark in recent years can be defined as ‘centralised decentralisation’ 
(Benner & Vad, 2000: 454) and ‘far-reaching decentralisation under central control’ (Visser et 
al., forthcoming). It could be argued that national control of the results of the policy and 
regional flexibility in the choice of instruments are needed. The main areas of labour market 
policy are still being set at a central level, in particular in the collective agreements, but an 
increasingly important role is being played by local actors and tripartite regional councils. 
This results in a Y-junction in policy: ‘the dilemma between decentralising responsibility and 
influence, while at the same time preserving an overall political control with goals and 
directions of the national labour market policy’ (Madsen, 1999: 58). But the risks attached to 
this form of coordination are estimated to be smaller than the benefits. As Benner & Vad 
(2000: 453) have argued: ‘Denmark’s recovery in the 1990s was not only the product of 
identifiable responses to economic internationalization and other challenges; it was also the 
outcome of major normative and functional changes in the Danish structure of political 
governance since the 1980s’. 
 
Visser (2001: 189) characterises the Danish system as a form of ‘associative corporatism’, 
and identifies the following essential characteristics: ‘A high level of interest representation of 
both capital and labour; a considerable dispersion of decisional authority and autonomy across 
organizations and to local levels; a limited role for the State as arbitrator and facilitator of 
agreements between autonomous interest organizations; a dense network of vertical and 
horizontal channels of representation and communication as the basis for decision making and 
reliance on iterative dialogue for conflict resultion and policy consensus’. Jørgensen’s 
extensive analysis (2002) points in the same direction and emphasises the consensus produced 
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Madsen et al. (2001) expect a shift in the future from ‘centralised decentralisation’ to 
multilevel regulation. This will mean an end to the top-down nature of governance and a 
move towards horizontal coordination. Decentralisation will go hand in hand with 
(re)centralisation. European legislation and policy is being seen as a new centre of control, in 
the middle of other centres. 
2.3. THE CASE OF GERMANY: SECURITY ABOVE FLEXIBILITY 
 
2.3.1 FLEXIBILITY AND SECURITY 
 
The debate in Germany on flexibility and security of labour is a highly emotive one. A large 
proportion of academic and policy circles is of the opinion that the German labour market 
urgently needs to become more flexible, in order among other things to tackle the persistently 
high levels of unemployment (Fuchs & Schettkat, 2000). The German government has also 
been resisting far-reaching measures. The emphasis on job and income security is rather 
strong. Recently, both the Dutch and Danish systems of regulation are regularly given as 
examples. There is also interest in the Dutch model of ‘flexicurity’ (Klammer & Tillmann, 
2001; Wilthagen, 1998). 
Policy in Germany is currently being aimed at increasing external numerical flexibility, but in 
practice these attempts have resulted in little change to date. The 
Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz was implemented as long ago as 1985. This law made it 
easier for employers to offer employees short-term employment contracts. The act did not, 
however, result either in mass use of short-term employment contracts (5% to 6% of all new 
employment contracts) nor in any significant growth in employment levels (less than 0.1% of 
total employment). This act was replaced on 1 January 2001 by the Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit 
und befristete Arbeitsverträge und zur Änderung und Aufhebung arbeitsrechtlicher 
Bestimmungen.
2 This act implemented European directives on part-time work and short-term 
employment contracts.
3 It is worth noting that the act greatly reduced the opportunities for 
                                                 
2 PzBfG, BGBl. I 2000 S. 1966. 
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short-term employment contracts, and introduced a great many protective constructions for 
employees.  
Another attempt involved relaxing the law on dismissal for smaller companies. But this 
measure was also reversed in 1999. Privatisation of employment mediation has also had little 
effect in practice. In 1994, the official monopoly on public employment mediation was broken 
and private organisations such as temporary employment agencies have since been able to 
offer their intermediary services. However, this has been accompanied by so many restrictions 
on the fees they can charge, that the market share of private intermediaries has not (yet) risen 
above 2% (in terms of the number of placements in the labour market).  
Reorganisation of employment mediation has recently been put on the agenda, following a 
number of cases of fraud at the Public Employment Services (PES). These cases have 
triggered the establishment of a government commission, the Harz Commission, formed by 
representatives from business and trade union associations and two academics, that in its 
report dated 16 August 2002 has proposed significant reforms of labour market and 
employment policy, including changing the PES’ 181 regional offices into de facto temporary 
employment agencies, referred to as `personnel service agencies´ (PersonalServiceAgentur, 
PSA). Any person still without a job after half a year would in effect be employed by these 
agencies, and hired out on a short-term basis (be it on trade union-negotiated rates), or have 
their benefits deducted. The Hartz Commission estimates that some 780,000 jobs could be 
created in this way.
4 Another recent of field of action where the social partners have initiated 
new regulatory arrangements is the reform of pension schemes (Schroeder & Weinert, 2002). 
In terms of flexibility, the emphasis in Germany remains on internal numerical flexibility. 
The level of overtime, in particular, remains high, at 3.6% of the total work performed by 
employees (EIRO, 2002). This is explained with a reference to the relatively high level of 
protection from dismissal, the relatively limited remuneration for overtime and the extensive 
subsidy schemes for working hours reduction (see Abraham and Houseman, quoted in Fuchs 
& Schettkat: 233-235). Flexibilisation of working hours and a reduction of overtime will 
continue to form the main focus of policy in future. This is shown from the agreements 
reached between the social partners on 10 July 2000 in the context of the Bündnis für Arbeit, 
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Ausbildung and Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. The goal is to achieve ‘eine differenzierte und 
flexibilisierte Arbeitszeitpolitik und den beschäftigungswirksamen Abbau von Überstunden’ 
(German National Plan of Action on Employment, p. 53). Flexibilisation of labour and 
stimulation of part-time work are seen as strategies for facilitating the combination of work 
and care. 
The phenomenon of flexible pay is not unknown in Germany, but it does not appear that this 
form of flexibilisation will undergo rapid growth (EIRO, 2001). In figure 4 presents the 
German policy developments in a nutshell. 
 
Figure 4: Focus and direction of German policy orientation on flexibility and security 
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It is a generally known fact that the stubborn unemployment issue in Germany is closely 
linked to the reunification of West and East Germany. In the literature, however, reference is 
also made to more fundamental problems in the German governance system. It is interesting 
to note that, unlike most other European countries, there is no joint coordination by the social 
partners and government in Germany. Everything is laid down in the sectoral collective 
agreement, and the parties involved traditionally have a great deal of autonomy 
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of labour market policy at the end of December 1998, when the government and 
representatives of employers and employees published a joint declaration under the title 
Bündnis für Arbeit, Ausbildung and Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Various tripartite working groups 
and consultative groups were set up as a result of this.  
It is still very unclear how this innovation will develop. The question remains as to whether 
this attempted form of central coordination can have any impact on the fundamental problem 
in the German governance system, identified by Manow & Seils (2000) as ‘dual 
externalisation’. These authors argue that companies in Germany pass on the costs of change 
to the welfare state, and that the German government in turn then tries to lighten the burden 
on its budget by restricting its share in the funding of social facilities. In particular, the 
concerted action of a federal government with limited opportunities to undertake active 
economic control, a highly independent central bank and autonomous social partners (the 
Tarifautonomie referred to above) appears to result in a maintenance of the status quo in 
Germany, which cannot adequately adapt to the new international and economic relationships, 
or adapts too slowly. 
There is pressure from below in Germany to decentralise the formation of employment 
conditions to a company level. The collective bargaining structure remains relatively stable, 
however, and regional agreements are on the increase (Klikauer, 2002). The extent to which 
sectoral collective agreements are changing in terms of content is unclear. German trade 
unions see many strategic obstacles facing the option of organised decentralisation as a means 
of providing regulated flexibility at the company level (French, 2001). As a result of strong 
procedural conditions, opening clauses in sectoral collective agreements provide companies 
with few opportunities to flexibilise labour and/or the organisation (Hassel, 1999). 
Increasingly, change appears to be taking place in companies without them adhering to 
collective agreements or works council consultation (Hassel, 1999). The declining level of 
organisation of employees and reduced scope of the collective labour agreement in Germany 
(EIRO, 2002) indicates that the pressure to decentralise is less ‘organised’ than it is in e.g. the 
Netherlands. 
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2.4. THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS: FLEXIBILITY AND SECURITY 
2.4.1 FLEXIBILITY AND SECURITY 
 
Up until the 1980s, the Netherlands was seen as a country with a relatively inflexible labour 
market, characterised in particular by stringent protection against dismissal and a passive 
social security policy. During these same years, unemployment figures grew dramatically, and 
the number of occupational disability benefits began to grow exponentially. The focus in 
those days was on numerical – in particular, external – flexibilisation of labour. This focus 
broadened in the 1990s to include key legislation and collective agreements on flexibility and 
security. During the development of this legislation in the 1980s and 1990s, four policy 
themes or ‘dossiers’ were brought together. The first dossier covered deregulation and 
flexibilisation of the labour market to promote economic growth and improve the competitive 
position. The second dossier addressed concerns about whether the social security system 
would be ‘affordable’. A third policy theme was combating the disadvantages and negative 
consequences of the flexibilisation of labour for what are known as ‘flexworkers’. Certain 
minimum standards were deemed necessary. Finally, there was a dossier on dismissal law, 
which is often criticised as being unnecessarily complex (a lawyer’s paradise) and too rigid.  
All these dossiers were linked together halfway through the 1990s. In 1996, the employers’ 
and employees’ organisations entered into an agreement at national level on ‘Flexibility and 
Security’, after the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment issued a policy memorandum 
on this subject in 1995. Both initiatives formed the basis for the Flexibility and Security Act 
which came into effect on 1 January 1999. This ‘flexwet’ led to a large number of changes in 
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-  amendment to rules covering short-term 
employment contracts: after three 
consecutive contracts or if the total length 
of consecutive contracts has been three 
years or more, an employment contract for 
an indefinite period comes into being (was 
after one extension) 
- the permit obligation for temporary 
employment agencies is withdrawn and 
the maximum length of time for 
temporary work scrapped 
-  the period of notice is one month in 
principle, with a maximum of four months 
(was six months) 
-  the dismissal procedure is shortened and 
in the case of redundancy due to the 
economic situation of the employer, 
employees no longer need to register an 
objection as a formality in order to secure 




-  introduction of two legal presumptions: 
the existence of an employment contract is 
assumed at an earlier stage 
-  a minimum claim for pay per call-out: 
each time a temporary employee is called 
to work, a minimum amount of three 
hours must be paid 
-  regulation of the division of wage 
payment risk if there is no work for a 
temporary employee: the maximum period 
during which employers are not required 
to pay wages for non-worked hours is six 
months 
-  from now on, the temporary employment 
agreement is deemed an employment 
contract, although during the first 26 
weeks of the temporary employment 
period, the agency and employee have a 
certain degree of freedom in terms of 
entering and severing the employment 
relationship 
-  protection from dismissal is introduced for 
employees carrying out trade union work 
in the company  
-  requests to dissolve the employment 
contracts of occupationally disabled 




The Dutch government submitted the Flexibility and Security Act as a ‘good practice’ in the 
National Plan of Action on Employment 1999, drawn up on the basis of European agreements 
(Treaty of Amsterdam, Luxembourg Summit in 1997). Evaluations were carried out. 
Employers and employees were guardedly positive (Grijpstra et al., 1999; De Klaver et al., 
2000; Van den Toren et al., 2002). There has been a shift from loose to fixed employment 
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relationships, and the new legislation has not formed an obstacle to this positive development 
on the labour market. The social security position of ‘external-flexible’ employees has 
improved somewhat, but the many interruptions in work patterns continue to cause problems 
in obtaining unemployment benefit. 
Another aspect that has affected flexibility and security in Dutch policy orientation is, of 
course, the stimulation of part-time work. The extremely strong growth of part-time work has 
been partly autonomous, but the act has provided an extra impulse. As of 2000, employees 
have had a conditional right to expand or reduce their working hours. Also related to this is 
the introduction of other laws in 2001 that are intended to facilitate an improved combination 
of ‘work and care’. This involves among other things pregnancy and childbirth leave, 
adoption and foster care, emergency leave, short-term sick leave, parental leave, career 
interruption and sabbatical leave. 
A relatively new Working Hours Act (1996) is aimed at increasing both the internal numerical 
flexibility for companies and the combination security for employees. Employers have been 
given greater opportunities to make the length of the workdays and workweeks dependent on 
the level of business activity, but must take the employees’ personal situation into account. 
Tailor-made work is encouraged by providing space at a sectoral and company level for self-
regulation, which deviates from the standards set by law. The design of the act is a typical 
example of coordinated and centrally regulated decentralisation. Many of the collective 
agreement partners at sectoral level have been following the line of ‘coordinated and 
regulated decentralisation’ by giving companies and works councils room within collective 
agreement frameworks for their own rules on working hours and breaks (Tros, 2002). 
Evaluation of this act has shown that the objective of increasing flexibilisation for employers 
has been achieved in particular (Mevissen et al., 2001). Trade unions and works councils are 
having difficulty implementing the objective of ‘combination security’ in rules at a business 
sector and company level. Where both objectives are partly at loggerheads to one another – 
such as in the case of unpredictable working hours – win-win situations are achieved at a 
decentral level. 
Apart from the hefty option schemes for top managers, the Netherlands has relatively little 
flexible remuneration. The social partners are ambivalent. While on the one hand, the 
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level, on the other there is a fear that this will undermine the national policy of wage 
moderation (Tros, 2000). An increase of this form of flexibilisation can also be expected in 
the Netherlands. Particularly in the context of individual performance-based pay, employers 
are attempting to include provisions in the collective agreements. The larger companies are 
experimenting with this concept. The trade unions are more prepared to make agreements on 
performance-based pay than they previously were, because part of their grass roots 
membership is in favour of it. 
And as the National Plan of Action on Employment 2001 has shown, the emphasis in future 
will no longer be on numerical flexibilisation. Policy orientation is now targeted at multi-
employability and training / participation of employees. Figure 6 sums up the direction of the 
Dutch developments. 
  
Figure 6: Focus and direction Dutch policy orientation regarding flexibility and security 
      
Forms of flexibility  Policy 
focus 
Direction Direction Policy 
focus 
Forms of security 
Numerical- 
External 
+     + Job  security 
Numerical- 
Internal 
+   +    Work  security 
Functional/ 
Internal 
 +    +  Income  security 
Wage  
flexibility 






Since 1945, the Netherlands has to a large extent relied for coordination of the labour market 
on consultative bodies at a national level (the bipartite Labour Foundation and tripartite Social 
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Netherlands can clearly be defined as ‘coordinated decentralisation’: control, direction and 
facilitation at central levels, but with increasing room for a decentral approach. Business 
sector collective agreements have remained highly dominant, despite the absolute growth in 
the number of company-wide collective agreements. Collective agreements have been 
gradually adapting by taking a framework structure which has been giving companies and 
individual employees increasing levels of choice (Tros, 2000, Tros, 2002). Both the market as 
coordination mechanism (employment provision) and the government (social security) have 
been more prominent. 
Since the mid-1990s, the Netherlands has received international praise for the way in which it 
has pursued and realised a new balance between flexibility and security. This success story is 
backed up by the strong growth in employment levels and by unemployment, which has 
dropped to a very low level. A key role in this has been played by self-regulation by 
employers and employees at a national level, under the shadow of hierarchy and the high level 
of attitudinal structuring (Visser, 2001). Nevertheless, the governance model in the 
Netherlands is under pressure. There is criticism of the slow speed of decision making, of the 
weakening of the primacy of government and the lack of differentiation in wage base 
determination (Wellink & Cavelaars, 2002). The criticism is being voiced primarily at an 
international level. But in the Netherlands as well, there is a growing demand for transparent 
and rapid decision making, which can be illustrated by the decline of established political 
parties which are more geared towards reaching a compromise.  
Secondly, the Dutch trade unions are being increasingly pushed into a corner due to their low 
levels of organisation (28% of the working population) and the political debate about their 
low level of representativity. Thirdly, there has been criticism of the increasing level of 
government interference in the area of work and care. Finally, pay restraint has been in 
decline since 1997. It is still too early to say what the effect of the coalition that came to 
power in July 2002 will be on the governance system. 
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3   SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COUNTRIES 
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the descriptions on the previous pages. Firstly, it 
has been shown that each country has specific forms of security and flexibility and that 
‘balances’ often came into being a long time ago. Secondly, the debate in each country on the 
issues of flexibility and security has, as expected, intensified during the past two decades. A 
third conclusion is that different emphasis is put in the countries studied on the forms of 
flexibilisation and security and on the relationship between these two factors. The emphasis in 
Germany and Belgium remains on more Fordist or ‘industrial’ forms of flexibility, in 
particular on internal-numerical flexibility. The Netherlands and Denmark, two countries that 
have more of the nature of a service economy, focus more on external-numerical flexibility. A 
similar division can be seen in the area of security. In Belgium and Germany, the emphasis 
remains on income security, while the Netherlands and Denmark are focusing increasingly on 
work security instead of (only) income security. Notwithstanding this continuity all 4 
countries show various dynamics of change, to some extent in similar directions (e.g wage 
flexibility). 
It also appears that existing, tried and tested bodies and coordination mechanisms are being 
used in the four countries in order to facilitate and direct adjustment processes. Fourthly, 
similar trends appear to be occurring in the countries: wage flexibility, internal/functional 
flexibility and combination security are being seen as increasingly important in all the 
countries. 
There are differences between the countries in terms of the extent to which coordinated 
flexicurity is realised. In Denmark, there is a clear trade-off between a high level of external-
numerical flexibility and a high level of income and (increasingly) work security. Since the 
end of the 19
th century, Danish workers have had little protection from dismissal, but with 
income protection, they have the security of being able to find a new job quickly, thanks to 
training, mediation and reintegration. In this respect, Germany differs most from Denmark. 
The security factor in Germany is very prominent and in practice it has proved to be difficult 
to introduce new forms of flexibility and security. The German situation can therefore be 
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demonstrated most clearly by new legislation and policy on external flexibility and work 
security. The Belgian situation can best be typified as a trade-off between internal numerical 
flexibility and job security. The Belgian system is difficult to define – it could be deemed 
traditional, but in any case it has a more limited level of balance between flexibility and 
security. 
Flexicurity strategies, which in the Netherlands and Denmark appear to focus on enhancing 
both numerical (external and internal) flexibility and work security, seem to have favourable 
effects on labour market participation. Recent figures published by Statistics Netherlands over 
the year 2001 reveal that Denmark and the Netherlands rank respectively no. 1 and 3 with 
respect to labour market participation rates in the EU (76% and 74%




                                                 
6 It should be mentioned that quite a large part of labour market participation in the Netherlands is in part-time employment. 
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4   BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
On the basis of the analyses of the four countries, which characteristics of and developments 
in governance systems appear to be beneficial or unfavourable to the formation and operation 
of flexicurity strategies? 
4.1 COORDINATED DECENTRALISATION 
 
Decentralisation appears to be having a beneficial effect on the introduction of flexicurity. 
Decentralisation has been set in motion under central control in both Denmark and the 
Netherlands. As a result of this, collective agreement parties, local organisations, companies 
and individual employers and employees have been given more room for tailor-made 
solutions with regard to flexibility and security wishes and needs. Furthermore, this process 
has been accompanied in both countries by good economic performance, which seems a 
positive condition for drawing up new rules on flexibility and security. One condition appears 
to be that decentralisation is coupled with strong coordination at a central level. Reference is 
increasingly being made in the literature to the simultaneous occurrence of decentralisation 
and increasing – although perhaps more gentle – central coordination (Léonard, 2001; Sisson 
& Marginson, 2002). In Germany, it would appear that decentralisation is less able to be 
coordinated by central parties, due to the lack of national coordination and the fact that the 
sectoral collective agreements have remained more rigid. The range of trade-off options 
available to employers and employees in Belgium at decentral level has been greatly limited 
by the fact that the state has intervened strongly in wage base determination 
National coordination appears to be important, among other things, for: 
(1)  ‘Mutual stimulation’ between government and the business community, and between 
legislation and self-regulation.  
(2)  Adequate response to European developments. 
(3)  Winning over smaller-scale interests in sectors/companies and promoting collective 
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(4) Getting flexicurity strategies on the agenda at decentral levels and facilitating such 
strategies at these levels. 
(5) Promoting learning processes in the area of flexicurity strategies between companies, 
sectors and regions. 
(5) Monitoring the effects of flexicurity strategies at decentral levels.  
 
There are, however, extensive limitations attached to the substantive content of flexicurity 
arrangements at a national or sectoral level. There are risks in the areas of: 
(1)  excessively strict/rigid rules, which are unworkable due to the heterogeneity of 
employers and employees 
(2) too little support and commitment at decentral levels 
(3) obstacles to efficient and effective trade-off possibilities at decentral levels. 
 
Combining the advantages of coordination and those of decentralisation points towards a new 
role for the social partners at the national and sectoral levels. The nature of legislation and 
national agreements will, to a limited extent, be substantive (let alone detailistic) and more 
generally controlling, procedural and facilitary in nature. There is also a great deal to be said 
for creating more room within the structure of sectoral collective agreements at company or 
regional levels. Though decentralised coordination may perhaps be easier to achieve in 
smaller countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands than in bigger countries as  e.g. 
Germany, it is by no means self-evident that this strategy develops in smaller countries, as the 
Belgian case illustrates. 
 
4.2 FLEXIBLE MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE 
 
Linked to the importance of coordinated decentralisation, a flexible multilevel governance 
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definition of problems (‘joint observation of facts’
7), it appears that consultation, negotiation 
and feedback can be ‘switched’ between various levels relatively quickly. This is e.g. far less 
the case in Germany, due to the lack of the link in the chain of a national bipartite consultative 
body and due to the far-reaching autonomy of the social partners at a sectoral level.  
 
4.3 EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING AND ‘NEGOTIATED 
FLEXIBILITY’ 
 
The hypothesis can be forwarded that a high degree of negotiated flexibility (see: Anxo & 
O’Reilly, 2000: 73-74) and broad negotiation agendas have contributed to the Netherlands 
and Denmark achieving a relatively high level of balance between flexibility and security. 
This is illustrated by the Danish “inclusive” approach to leave, training and job rotation. It is 
also demonstrated by the many flexicurity aspects, which together have been implemented in 
Dutch laws and regulations. 
Extending the scope of collective bargaining leads to an increase in the range of trade-off 
options between flexibility and security. By negotiating not only about wages and working 
hours, security for employees need no longer be sought only in income security, but also in 
the maintenance of a good position in the internal and external labour market (e.g. in terms of 
training, employability, flexible organisation of work, etc). Adding the flexibilisation 
strategies of employers to the bargaining agenda and discussing them in an integrated manner 
along with security for the employees results in an increase in the acceptance of flexibilisation 
among employees. This encourages “positive coordination”,  ‘integrative bargaining’, 
‘positive-sum-games’ and ‘negotiated flexibility’, enabling mutual gains to be achieved and 
better enabling achievement of the double requirement of flexibility and security. Mutual 
trust, based on an understanding for mutual interests, forms a crucial factor here. 
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5 FURTHER RESEARCH INTO FLEXICURITY 
 
Much of that which has been described in this paper has had to be kept short and hypothetical, 
due to a lack of empirical and theoretic research. In order to obtain greater insight into the 
backgrounds, objectives and forms of flexicurity strategies, more in-depth research will have 
to be carried out into existing flexicurity strategies, whether they have been identified as such 
or not. It would be interesting to find out whether certain trade-offs are obvious, which trade-
offs can be brought about synchronously and in a deliberate manner, and whether shifts are 
taking place towards new forms of flexibility and security. Evaluation studies are also needed 
into the effects of flexibility and security regulations and policies. 
It is important to ensure that the empirical research is guided by theory, reflecting on the 
nature and political economy of the flexibility-security nexus. In view of the various positions 
and interests of the parties at various governance levels, it is important to carry out research 
into flexicurity strategies at various levels. Research into the HRM policies of companies is 
necessary, in view of the tendency towards decentralisation and the specific social position of 
individual companies. 
Furthermore, cross-national comparisons are required for obtaining insight into the beneficial 
or non-beneficial conditions for the formation and operation of flexicurity strategies. The 
question can also be asked in this context as to whether the content and design of flexicurity 
in various countries differ greatly or whether there is a form of convergence, resulting from 
learning and benchmarking processes and/or EU-regulations. Experiences during the 1980s 
and 1990s in the context of the flexibility-security nexus in the four countries seem to point 
towards a continuing diversity. Companies are getting round existing nationally bound 
rigidities by looking for flexibility in other areas (Kalleberg, 2001) and, likewise, employees 
will move over to other aspects of security if certain aspects of security are not forthcoming. 
The question of the influence of various forms of coordination and the relationships between 
national and international learning processes with regard to flexicurity strategies is crucial 
from an academic perspective. It can increase insight, in particular, into the question of 
whether employment relationship systems are really developing in the direction of multilevel 
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